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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses probabilistic causality measures to support decisions about bailouts of financial 
institutions in non-crisis periods. The model suggested is simple and can easily be applied by 
practitioners. The approach is tested with daily market-based data of six large UK financial 
institutions. Contrary to what many experts claim, this study shows evidence that rescuing 
financial institutions is not always needed in order to prevent systemic crises. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The failure of a financial institution may trigger the bankruptcy of other institutions which 
certainly would result in national or even global economic crises. The failure of the American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 illustrates this situation. Some experts suggest that 
this problem can be avoided if financial institutions in distress are rescued by lenders of last 
resort (LOLR). The first proponents to formalize this idea were Thornton(1) and Bagehot(2), 
according to whom, central banks (acting as LOLR) should lend as much resources as required 
by financial institutions in order to avoid economic crises. 
However, other authors argue that the safety net provided by LOLR organizations stimulate an 
excessive risk-taking behavior (the so-called moral hazard) that tend to result in crises. In other 
words, the injection of resources from a LOLR may give bank managers and shareholders 
incentive to take additional risk and may reduce the incentives for creditors to monitor the 
financial institutions.(3,4,5)   
Freixas and Parigi(6) and Freixas(7) point out that bailouts are justified only if their benefits 
(prevention of financial crises) outweigh their costs (stimulation of excessive risk taking in the 
future). Nevertheless, although these suggestions seem to be appealing, they have a downside in 
the sense that there would be a large degree of discretion in the LOLR’s decisions. Given this 
challenge, the main objective of this study is to propose quantitative indicators that will help 
national governments and other entities acting as LOLR to quickly decide in a rational manner 
when the spillover risk represented by the failure of a particular financial institution is high 
enough to justify the bailout in spite of the potential excessive risk taken in the future. The moral 
hazard will be assumed to be a worthwhile side effect when the bankruptcy of a single institution 
would trigger a financial crisis if that institution was not supported. As stated by Stan Fischer 
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(First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, IMF), cited in Goodhart 
and Illing(8) (p. 24): “Moral hazard is something to be lived with and controlled rather than fully 
eliminated”. 
In sum, decisions on bailouts reflect the systemic importance of the financial institutions 
assessed. That is, a financial institution should be rescued only if its failure would negatively 
impact on other institutions, which means that we would face the risk of a systemic crisis. 
Systemic risk measures often mentioned in the literature, such as the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall - MES (Acharya et al.(9)), the Conditional Value at Risk – CoVaR (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier(10)) and the CoRisk (Chan-Lau et al.(11)), are associative measures and do not allow 
us to draw conclusions on causality. When relying on these approaches, all we can say is whether 
or not the failure of institutions, say Banks A and B, tend to occur simultaneously. If they do, it 
is possible that there is a common cause for the bankruptcy of A and B which means that if a 
LOLR rescues one of the institutions this will not prevent the failure of the other one. 
Danielsson et al.(12) emphasize that regulators should know whether or not a financial institution 
represents a risk to other institutions and simply associations do not allow us to conclude if an 
initial failure will spill over into other institutions.  
In this context, we develop an approach based on probabilistic causality theory with a view to 
evaluating the potential impact of the failure of financial institutions on other financial 
institutions. Our main academic contribution is to propose a systemic risk measure method 
focused on a causality technique rather than on an associative one. In practical terms, we also 
contribute to LOLRs’ analysts in charge of assessing the appropriateness of bailouts.  
We test our method by using daily stock return data of six large UK financial institutions. Our 
findings indicate that, although bailouts of large institutions are typically recommended, on some 
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occasions the bankruptcy of institutions in our sample would not have negative immediate effect 
on other institutions. This is an important piece of information to LOLRs because it suggests 
that, in those cases, bailing out distressed institutions would feed moral hazard in the banking 
sector without any benefit in terms of avoiding financial crises.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the method used 
and the approach suggested. The data used in our empirical analyses is described in Section 3. 
Our results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. METHOD 
2.1. Probabilistic causality 
The notion of probability is implicit in causality statements. For instance, it is commonly said 
that smoking causes lung cancer but it does not mean that all smokers will develop that type of 
malignancy. Even if we say that an icy road is the cause of a particular car accident, many cars 
pass over the same spot and are not involved in any mishap (Salmon(13), Chapter 14). Therefore, 
these statements are not deterministic; they only imply the fact that some situations or events 
(e.g. smoking) tend to increase the chances of something else happening (e.g. lung cancer).  
The foundations of the theory of probabilistic causality were provided by Good(14,15) and 
Suppes(16). A number of improvements have been proposed (see especially Eells(17)) but the key 
idea remains the same: causes raise the probabilities of their effects.  
For consistent, we present the theory by using the notation that will be used ahead in the analysis 
of contagion across financial institutions. An event A is causally relevant to an event B if there is 
at least one condition M in some background context such that P(A|B,M) > P(A|¬B,M), where 
¬B indicates the non-occurrence of B (see, e.g. Eells(17) and Pearl(18), p. 250). In other words, B is 
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causally relevant to A if the probability of A happening conditional (represented by the symbol 
“|”) on the presence of B and M is higher than the probability of A happening conditional on the 
absence of B and the presence of M. Including M as a conditioning term on both sides of the 
expression above guarantees a constant background scenario (in theory, all the other factors that 
might impact on A) that holds fixed the presence or absence of confounding factors. This allows 
us to focus on the specific effect of B on A.    
 
2.2. Chain rule for conditional probability 
The probability of n joint events A1,…,An can be expressed as: (19) 
P(A1,…,An) = P(A1).P(A2|A1) … P(A1|An-1,…,A1) 
where P(.) is the probability of an event and | means “conditional on”. So, the probability of the 
occurrence of an event conditional on other events can be expressed as: 
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For three events (which will be the structure of the approach suggested in Section 2.3), using the 
notation introduced in Section 2.1, we have: 
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2.3. An approach to support bailout decisions 
We apply the probabilistic causality theory to provide bailout evaluators with evidence about the 
impact of the distress of a financial institution on other institutions. Systemic importance of 
financial institutions is the key factor to guide decisions about the pertinence of bailouts. That is, 
(1) 
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only systemically important institutions should be rescued while institutions in distress that tend 
not to impact on other agents should be allowed to fail. Note that, as discussed in Section 1, 
bailing out the latter type of institutions would encourage higher risk taking which, in turn, 
would result in more severe crises in the future. 
We define financial distress as situations when the stock return of institutions is below the 5th 
percentile of their respective returns in a given period. For instance, assume that the stock return 
of institution A is -2.5% today. If we decide to use last year as our benchmark period, we should 
check if -2.5% is smaller than the 5th percentile of the distribution of A’s stock returns last year. 
If so, A is considered to be in distress today. 
The market conditions M can be represented, for example, by the main stock market index in the 
country analyzed. In the tests ahead, we are interested in the situations where the market is not in 
the distress, i.e., when M is greater than the 5th percentile of its distribution in a past period. 
By focusing on M values above its 5th percentile (or any other percentile), we screen off the 
impact of B on A from scenarios when distress is caused by a common factor that simultaneously 
affects several or all banks. This means that this approach is more appropriate for tranquil market 
conditions or booms (i.e. not for downturns). In times of crises, the financial markets do not 
operate “as usual” and the panic created by bad news and the uncertainty simultaneously impact 
on many financial institutions which, in other circumstances, would not suffer any damage as a 
consequence of the distress of other institutions. Our results in Section 4 illustrate this point. 
The use of stock returns is usual in systemic risk measures heavily cited in the literature (e.g. 
MES and CoVaR, mentioned in Section 1). This kind of data is available at a relatively high 
(daily) frequency in comparison to other types of data such as accounting data retrieved from 
balance sheets, which means that our results can be updated on a daily basis. This is an important 
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feature of risk measures as the situation may change very quickly and information referring to 
few months or a year in the past may not represent the financial institutions’ situation on the day 
when they require support.   
Following the notation defined above and adding the subscript t to indicate the time of the 
realizations, bailouts are recommended if: 
P(At|Bt,Mt) > P(At|¬Bt,Mt) 
where At and Bt represent the distress of institutions A and B, respectively, at time t. Mt are the 
market conditions at time t. That is, financial support should be granted to institution B at time t 
if the probability of A’s distress at time t conditional on B being in distress at t and on particular 
market conditions M at t is higher than the probability of A being in distress at t conditional on B 
not being in distress at t (i.e., ¬Bt) and on the same particular market conditions M at t. In other 
words, we are checking if the presence of B (i.e. institution B’s distress) raises the probability of 
A (i.e., institution A’s distress). The conditional probabilities in (2) are estimated by means of 
expression (1) derived from the chain rule for conditional probability. 
It is worth noting that, if there is evidence that the potential impact of B on A is not immediate, 
lagged data of B and M can be used. 
 
3. DATA 
We test the probabilistic causality approach suggested in Section 2.3 by considering six of the 
seven major UK banks and building societies assumed to have a material impact on the resilience 
of the UK financial system, namely Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), Santander UK, and Standard Chartered.. These institutions were included in the most 
(2) 
8 
 
recent stress testing of the UK banking system1. The other institution considered in that exercise, 
Nationwide Building Society, is not included in this study due to the lack of data. 
We use daily stock returns from 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2015 to identify situations where financial 
institutions are in distress. The stock index FTSE100 is used as a proxy for market conditions. 
Our sample period starts in 2005 because the data for some of the banks analyzed is scarce 
before that year. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Baseline tests 
We check the results of expression (2) for all pairs of institutions in our sample by initially using 
moving windows of 250 business days (around one year) immediately before the day, t, when we 
decide about the pertinence of bailouts. The first value calculated to guide bailout decisions 
refers to the 251st day in our sample period because the first 250 days are used to calculate the 
(5th) percentile that will work as the benchmark to check the condition in inequality (2). Thus, if 
the stock return on the 251st day is smaller than the 5th percentile of the distribution of returns 
from the 1st to the 250th day, the respective institution is said to be in distress on the 251st day. 
Next, the stock return on the 252nd day is compared to the 5th percentile of the distribution of 
returns from the 2nd to the 251st day, and so on until the last day in the sample period. 
Each side in inequality (2) is calculated following expression (1). After simplifications, it 
becomes the number of days when we observe the simultaneous occurrence of the three events in 
                                                          
1 See “Stress Testing the UK Banking System: Guidance for Participating Banks and Building Societies” (March 
2016).  The seventh institution considered in the stress testing exercise, Nationwide Building Society, is not included 
in our sample due to the lack of data. 
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the numerator divided by the number of days when we observe the simultaneous occurrence of 
the two events in the denominator2. 
When the condition stated in expression (2) is met, institution B should be bailed out. Table 1 
shows the number of days on which the distress of an institution would cause the distress in other 
institutions. For the purpose of presenting our results, we adopt a conservative approach and 
indicate bailouts as necessary when equation (1) is not defined (i.e. normally in downturns when 
M is below its 5th percentile). In other words, we give institution B (the one under distress) the 
“benefit of the doubt”. Our main objective is to challenge the idea of “too-big-to-fail” and try to 
avoid unnecessary bailouts that would feed increasing risk taking in the banking sector, which 
would make the financial system even more vulnerable to crises in the future. When we cannot 
show evidence against financial rescues, we assume that they are acceptable. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
For example, take the intersection of the two rows “Barclays” with the column “HSBC” in Table 
1. The upper row referring to bailout (“1926”) means that HSBC’s distress would cause (in the 
probabilistic sense) Barclays’s distress on 1926 days in the period analyzed. On the other hand, 
HSBC’s distress would not negatively impact Barclays on 444 days of our sample period (this 
number can be found in the intersection regarding the lower row). It is worth noting that, in each 
cell, we are evaluating the institution listed in the column title (HSBC in the aforementioned 
example); that is, the distress of institutions in the rows is caused by the distress of institutions in 
the columns. However, the pertinence of bailouts should be evaluated in relation to the cause of 
                                                          
2 Both the numerator and the denominator in (1) are divided by the total number of days in the sample period, which, 
therefore, cancels each other out.  
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distress in any of the other institutions. Simply adding the number of days when bailouts are not 
recommended in a particular column does not give us the actual number of days we are looking 
for because Table 1 does not indicate if the days in a column are the same for all conditioned 
institutions (the ones in the rows) or if they are different. For example, HSBC’s bailout is not 
recommended on 444, 444, 58, 458, and 378 days with respect to the other five institutions in our 
sample but we do not know which of those days are the same and which ones are different.  
Therefore, institutions should be rescued if they cause (again, in the probabilistic sense) the 
distress of at least one of the other institutions on a particular day. These results are shown in 
Table 2, where we see that Barclays, Lloyds and RBS would need to be bailed out on all days 
considered while HSBC, Santander UK and Standard Chartered would not impact on any of the 
other institutions in the sample on 494, 153, and 163 days, respectively (which means that the 
LOLR should refrain from supporting those institutions on those respective days). These 
numbers suggest that the market perceives HSBC to be the least systemically important bank 
among the largest UK financial institutions. In contrast, Barclays, Lloyds and RBS are seen as 
the most systemically important and should be bailed out whenever they are in distress.    
  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  
In order to illustrate the evolution of the days when bailouts are recommended or not, we present 
plots concerning evaluations of HSBC over the whole sample period. Each panel refers to a pair 
between HSBC and another institution. Plots of the other institutions are not shown for the sake 
of space but are available upon request. 
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The solid line refers to the probability of the other institution becoming distressed conditional on 
HSBC’s distress and on favorable market conditions (M greater than the 5th percentile in the 
distribution of M’s past values, showing that, in principle, there would not be any common factor 
responsible for the distress of HSBC and of the other institution); the dashed line represents the 
probability of the other institution becoming distressed conditional on HSBC’s non-distress and 
on favorable market conditions. When the solid line is above the dashed line, HSBC’s bailout is 
recommended. 
According to Panel A, HSBC’s bailouts with respect to its importance to Barclays should be 
granted in three main periods: from the beginning of our sample period until August 2007, 
between March 2010 and March 2011, and from August 2013 to October 2014. On the other 
hand, bailouts would not be recommended in the periods August 2007 – July 2008, January 2010 
– March 2010, March 2011 – January 2012, and August 2012 – July 2013. The areas where both 
lines are not visible in the plot indicate unfavorable market conditions. As said above, these 
circumstances do not allow us to use this technique to draw conclusions on the appropriateness 
of bailouts but, given the absence of evidence against bailouts, we argue in favor of rescues in 
these cases. 
To some extent, Panels B to E in Figure 1 present similar patterns, namely: three (two when 
Lloyds is the conditioned bank) groups of days when bailouts would be justifiable and three or 
four chunks when bailouts would not be recommended. This corroborates the validity of our 
model given that this property is more reasonable and practical than a measure that results in 
frequent (e.g. daily) changes between the pertinence and the inappropriateness of bailouts.  
Note that decisions on bailouts cannot be made based on individual plots given that the 
institution under analysis may not be systemic important to another particular institution but can 
12 
 
be relevant to other institutions. Thus, in the context of our sample, on every day, the pertinence 
of rescuing HSBC should be assessed by means of all the panels in Figure 1 together. This 
evaluation results in the numbers presented in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The results in 2008 and 2009 confirm that this method is not proper for analyses in critical 
periods such as the Global Financial Crisis in that period. Both lines (regarding HSBC’s distress 
and non-distress) are virtually zero or not defined in Panels A to C and we cannot distinguish 
between them. This happens because the denominator and the numerator in expression (1) 
depend on situations when the market conditions M are above its 5th historical percentile. In 
periods of crises, those values of M tend not to be in the left tail, so it is not common to observe 
“high” values of M values. Therefore, the joint probability of M being greater than its 5th 
percentile and institutions being in distress or healthy is typically zero.  
 
4.2. Additional tests 
We test another two time windows: 125 business days (around one semester) and 65 business 
days (around one quarter). Tables 3 and 4 show the results concerning 125-day time windows 
and Tables 5 and 6 show the results for 65-day time windows. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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In Table 3, the analysis of each pair of institutions reveals that, except when Barclays is the 
conditioned bank (first two rows), the number of days when bailouts are not recommended is 
larger than the number of days when conditioning institutions should be rescued.  This indicates 
that Barclays is the most susceptible bank to failures of other institutions. In general, the ratio of 
non-bailouts is much higher in this second analysis than in the analysis based on 250-day time 
windows. Although it is not reported in Tables 1 and 3, the ratio between the number of non-
bailout and bailout days is 0.43 in the former and 1.70 in the latter. That is, bailouts are 
considered unnecessary much more often when we take into account data from one semester 
before the assessment rather than one year before it. 
The higher number of non-bailout days is corroborated by Table 4: in comparison to Table 2, the 
number of non-bailout days is much higher. Using this criterion, the systemic importance 
ranking changes but, as in the 250-day time window, HSBC and Standard Chartered are the least 
systemically important institutions (highest number of days when its rescue would not be 
necessary). The main difference refers to RBS, which in the previous analyses was found to be 
the most systemically important UK institution together with Barclays and Lloyds, is the third 
least risky in these tests based on 125-day time windows. Barclays remains as the most 
systemically important (i.e. its bailout is recommended on the largest number of days in the 
sample). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results in our shortest windows (65 days), presented in Table 5, show similar ratios between 
the number of non-bailout and bailout days at the pair level when compared to the findings in 
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Table 1. As per the final decisions (Table 6), the number of non-bailout days is more 
homogeneous across the institutions in the sample compared to the previous analyses. The list of 
systemic importance, from the lowest to the highest, is Santander UK, RBS, Lloyds, Standard 
Chartered, HSBC and Barclays.  
 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
  
The difference in most of the classifications based on different time windows may be explained 
by the fact that longer periods (one year, in our tests) tend to capture economic cycles that tend 
contribute to a stronger connection across financial institutions (and therefore a higher number of 
bailouts recommended), which is not evident in semester or quarter periods. The little variation 
regarding the number of bailouts and non-bailouts for different institutions in the evaluation 
based on the shortest window (65 days) indicates that short periods are not sufficient to unravel 
the peculiarities of particular links among institutions. For that reason, using one-year time 
windows appears to be the best option among the ones tested here. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
To refrain from bailing out institutions whose  insolvency tends to trigger generalized crises or to 
bail out institutions that do not represent substantial systemic risk will certainly have negative 
consequences to the economy (in the short or in the long run). The latest example of the former 
situation was the collapse of the bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 and some examples of the latter 
might be hidden in the several bailouts recently occurred in many countries (e.g. UK and Spain). 
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We contribute to solving this challenging problem by presenting a method based on probabilistic 
causality that can help LOLRs identify situations when bailouts are unnecessary. Our empirical 
analyses considering six large UK financial institutions support the pertinence of bailouts most 
of the time but we also indicate few days when, in principle, the failure of specific institutions 
would not impact on other institutions. This information contributes to the reduction of potential 
negative effects (moral hazard) from unconditional bailouts to all large financial institutions. 
It is important to note that the method proposed here is not intended to be used alone. It should 
be seen as an additional tool available for decision makers. Furthermore, our suggestion is 
limited to periods of normal or booming market activities and it is not adequate for unfavorable 
scenarios such as generalized panics and financial crises. Notwithstanding, this approach is an 
advance in terms of providing support for LOLR decisions about the pertinence of bailouts. In 
principle, decisions in the context of panic remain at the discretion of LOLRs and based on their 
feeling of the market. This paper opens an avenue for models that aim at distinguishing the 
causal association among financial institutions not only in upturns but also in downturns, which 
is the scenario when most of the banks are more likely to be in distress. In other to do so, a 
number of other causality techniques should be tested and other types of data (apart from stock 
returns) could also be used, such as Credit Default Swap spread.  
Finally, we suggest that the method proposed here be adapted to other areas that involve risk 
analyses and the need of causal interpretations. 
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Table 1: Number of days when the distress of institutions in the rows is caused by the distress of 
institutions in the columns (time window: 250 days) 
 
  Conditional on the distress of 
  Barclays HSBC Lloyds RBS 
Santander 
UK 
Standard 
Chartered 
Barclays 
Distress  - 1926 1946 1823 1395 1786 
Non-distress  - 444 424 547 975 584 
        
HSBC 
Distress  1432 - 1255 1714 1073 1327 
Non-distress  938 - 1115 656 1297 1043 
        
Lloyds 
Distress  2123 1926 - 2257 1358 1681 
Non-distress  247 444 - 113 1012 689 
        
RBS 
Distress  1927 2312 2184 - 1175 1473 
Non-distress  443 58 186 - 1195 897 
        
Santander 
UK 
Distress  1740 1912 1526 1416 - 1842 
Non-distress  630 458 844 954 - 528 
        
Standard 
Chartered 
Distress  1957 1992 1675 1540 1668 - 
Non-distress  413 378 695 830 702 - 
 
 
Table 2: Number of days when bailouts are recommended or not (time window: 250 days) 
 
 Bailout Non-bailout 
Barclays 2370 0 
HSBC 1876 494 
Lloyds 2370 0 
RBS 2370 0 
Santander UK 2217 153 
Standard Chartered 2207 163 
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Table 3: Number of days when the distress of institutions in the rows is caused by the distress of 
institutions in the columns (time window: 125 days) 
 
  Conditional on the distress of 
  Barclays HSBC Lloyds RBS 
Santander 
UK 
Standard 
Chartered 
Barclays 
Distress  - 1839 2167 2177 1383 1523 
Non-distress  - 901 573 563 1357 1217 
        
HSBC 
Distress  877 - 1044 825 813 832 
Non-distress  1863 - 1696 1915 1927 1908 
        
Lloyds 
Distress  1425 1044 - 1401 1037 1061 
Non-distress  1315 1696 - 1339 1703 1679 
        
RBS 
Distress  1322 825 1401 - 780 701 
Non-distress  1418 1915 1339 - 1960 2039 
        
Santander 
UK 
Distress  793 813 1037 780 - 1312 
Non-distress  1947 1927 1703 1960 - 1428 
        
Standard 
Chartered 
Distress  672 832 1061 701 1312 - 
Non-distress  2068 1908 1679 2039 1428 - 
 
 
Table 4: Number of days when bailouts are recommended or not (time window: 125 days) 
 
 Bailout Non-bailout 
Barclays 2535 205 
HSBC 1526 1214 
Lloyds 1810 930 
RBS 1625 1115 
Santander UK 1862 878 
Standard Chartered 1527 1213 
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Table 5: Number of days when the distress of institutions in the rows is caused by the distress of 
institutions in the columns (time window: 65 days) 
 
  Conditional on the distress of 
  Barclays HSBC Lloyds RBS 
Santander 
UK 
Standard 
Chartered 
Barclays 
Distress  - 2206 2255 2276 2029 1689 
Non-distress  - 534 485 464 711 1051 
        
HSBC 
Distress  1973 - 1821 1704 1686 1796 
Non-distress  767 - 919 1036 1054 944 
        
Lloyds 
Distress  2161 1960 - 2309 1892 1907 
Non-distress  579 780 - 431 848 833 
        
RBS 
Distress  2058 1719 2185 - 1640 1483 
Non-distress  682 1021 555 - 1100 1257 
        
Santander 
UK 
Distress  1898 1788 1855 1727 - 2019 
Non-distress  842 952 885 1013 - 721 
        
Standard 
Chartered 
Distress  1636 1976 1948 1648 2097 - 
Non-distress  1104 764 792 1092 643 - 
 
 
Table 6: Number of days when bailouts are recommended or not (time window: 65 days) 
 
 Bailout Non-bailout 
Barclays 2689 51 
HSBC 2638 102 
Lloyds 2599 141 
RBS 2595 145 
Santander UK 2586 154 
Standard Chartered 2637 103 
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Figure 1: Probability of distress of institutions conditional on HSBC’s distress or non-distress 
Panel A: Probability of Barclays’s distress conditional on HSBC 
  
Panel B: Probability of Lloyds’s distress conditional on HSBC 
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Panel C: Probability of RBS’s distress conditional on HSBC 
 
 
Panel D: Probability of Santander UK’s distress conditional on HSBC 
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Panel E: Probability of Standard Chartered’s distress conditional on HSBC 
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